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ABSTRACT
Under the current model of corporate fiduciary law, informational asymmetry between
directors and creditors makes the debt contract inadequate to govern efficiently the debtorcreditor relationship. In particular, as currently devised, the debt contract fails to prevent
managerial opportunism; i.e., the managers’ tendency to increase the investment’s risk ex-post.
Anticipating the contract’s failure, creditors ask higher interest rates. Moreover, because of the
scarcity of observable information, creditors tend to pool firms together and price debt on the
basis of the average risk increase. As a result, credit capital is inefficiently allocated.
A default duty of directors to creditors, paired to a regime of textualist interpretation of
the debt contract, would redress the existing inefficiency. By sanctioning directors’ with personal
liability for increasing the level of risk contractually accepted by creditors, the duty would serve
as a bonding mechanism against managerial opportunism and induce directors to fulfill the
contract. In addition, the adoption of a textualist interpretative regime would prompt a Nash
bargaining between the parties, which would give both of them the right incentives to write more
state-contingent contracts. In this way, not only would monitoring and opportunity costs be
reduced, but also credit capital would be more efficiently allocated. Indeed, the higher level of
specification of debt contracts would induce creditors to price debt on the basis of such
specification, rather than through a pooling mechanism. As a result, a Pareto improvement in the
market equilibrium could be achieved.

*

J.S.D. Candidate, Yale Law School. E-mail: simone.sepe@yale.edu

-1-

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
PART I
THE ACADEMIC DEBATE
1. THE RATHER DIFFERENT VIEWS OF CONTRACTARIANS AND COMMUNITARIANS
2. A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
2.1. THE INEFFICIENCY OF THE MULTIFIDUCIARY MODEL
2.2. THE LIMITS OF THE CONTRACTARIAN PERSPECTIVE
PART II
THE POSITIVE ANALYSIS
1. THE CORPORATE CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
2. CREDIT LYONNAIS BANK NEDERLAND, N.V. V. PATHE COMMUNICATIONS CORP.
2.1. FROM THE INSOLVENCY EXCEPTION TO THE FINANCIAL DISTRESS EXCEPTION
2.2. THE INADEQUACY OF THE NPV TEST
PART III
A NORMATIVE THEORY
1. DIRECTORS’ DUTY TO CREDITORS
2. CONTRACT AND DUTY: THE BONDING MECHANISM FUNCTION
3. THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE DUTY AND THE NEED FOR A TEXTUALIST INTERPRETATIVE
REGIME
4. EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY
5. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CAPITAL PROVIDERS AND OTHER FIXED CLAIMANTS
6. SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION
Both courts and scholars have long interpreted the directors’ duty to pursue the
interest of the corporation as an exclusive obligation to maximize shareholder wealth.
This view of corporate fiduciary law is commonly referred to as shareholder primacy
rule.1 As a consequence, a fiduciary duty of directors to creditors has been traditionally

1

The landmark decision on the shareholder primacy rule is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W.
668, 684 (Mich. 1919), in which the court expressly established that: “[a] business corporation is organized
and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.” More recent judicial opinions reinforcing the
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denied in American corporate law,2 but for one exception: the insolvency of the
corporation. In this special circumstance, creditors would take the place of shareholders
as the parties with an equitable interest in the corporate assets and this would justify the
shift of fiduciary duties3 in their favor. In the past twenty years, however, the shareholder
primacy rule has undergone mounting criticism. Largely beginning with the concerns
caused by the takeover explosion of the 1980s, legal scholars have widely discussed
whether directors should pursue also the interests of other corporate constituencies, in
particular that of company creditors. The enactment by most American states of corporate
constituency statutes, which authorize directors to consider non-shareholder interests in
the corporate decision-making, has further challenged the conventional framework. The
turning point of the debate over directors’ duties, however, has been the 1991 Credit

legacy of the shareholder primacy rule include, among others, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986); and Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch.
1986). As to the scholarly contributions on the matter, see, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A
Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1921 (1996) ("The efficiency goal of
maximizing the company'
s value to investors [is] the principal function of corporate law."); Sthephen M.
Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1993) (“Shareholder wealth maximization long has been the
fundamental norm which guides U.S. corporate decisionmakers.”); Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee,
Shareholders, Non-shareholders, and Corporate Law: Communitarians and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 393, 393 (1993) (“It has been the dominant American conception of the corporation for many
years that a corporation'
s primary goal is, and should be, the maximization of shareholder welfare.”); D.
Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 280 (1998) (“The shareholder primacy
norm is considered fundamental to corporate law.”); Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors:
Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1214 (2003) (“The
shareholder maximization norm is the dominant theoretical approach to directorial duties.”) In addition,
Professors Hansmann and Kraakman note that “the dominance of a shareholder-centered ideology of
corporate law” is not limited to the American experience, but is the rule “in key commercial jurisdictions.”
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439
(2001).
2

The decisions on the matter are copious. See, e.g., Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch.
1974) (dismissing bondholders’ suit which alleged breach of directors’ fiduciaries duties on the ground that
such duties do not exist); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988) (stating that creditors of solvent
corporations are not entitled to directorial fiduciary duties because they do not hold any existing property
right or equitable interest which supports the imposition of such duties); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR
Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (affirming that the rights of corporate debtholders are
limited to those arising from the contract governing debtor-creditor relationships).
3

Managers’ fiduciary duty to shareholders is composed of the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.
Thus, the discourse on the extension of managers’ accountability to other corporate constituencies has
alternatively referred to (the) duty or duties of directors.
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Lyonnais decision.4 In that case, it was first established that directors’ duties shift to
creditors upon the financial distress of the corporation, rather than upon its insolvency.
In this essay, I argue that the problem of directors’ duty to creditors is basically a
problem of contract efficiency. Under the current paradigm of corporate fiduciary law,
the contract fails to govern the debtor-creditor relationship pursuant to a welfare
maximization criterion.5 To enable parties to write better debt contracts, I propose to
adopt a corporate governance model providing for a permissive regime of directors’ duty
to creditors and a textualist interpretation of the debt contract. Such a model would
increase efficiency by serving two basic functions: (i) discouraging managerial
opportunism; and (ii) inducing directors to disclose credible information. This would
result not only in a reduction of monitoring and opportunity costs, but also in a more
efficient allocation of credit capital. Finally, the proposed model would also limit
uncertainty in legal relationships.
In a corporate governance system dominated by the shareholder primacy rule,
informational asymmetry between managers and creditors makes the debt contract
inadequate to govern efficiently the parties’ relationship and, in particular, to prevent
managerial opportunism. Not only do managers have information on the investment’s
underlying risk that is not observable to creditors; but also, under the current paradigm of
corporate fiduciary law, they have weak incentives to disclose this information.
Furthermore, since creditors expect managers to act in the shareholders’ interest, they
may be reluctant to consider disclosed information credible. These informational
asymmetry problems and the absence of a strong bonding mechanism inducing directors
to fulfill the contract result in the credit agreement’s failure to deter managerial
opportunism. The latter is the tendency of managers,6 acting as shareholders’ fiduciaries,
to increase the investment’s level of risk as the company incurs indebtedness (what is
4

Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del.
Ch., LEXIS 215, (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991), reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1099.
5

Indeed, I share the idea that “the state should choose the rules that regulate commercial
transactions according to the criterion of welfare maximization.” Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003). Under this view, social
welfare would be measured by the number of contracts that maximize ex-ante the gains of contracting
parties.
6

In this work, the terms managers and directors are indifferently used to indicate the parties who are
in charge of the company business and control.
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commonly referred to as asset substitution).7 Given the limited liability of shareholders
for corporate debts, this may lead to the expropriation of creditor value.8 Creditors,
however, anticipate the contract’s failure and charge higher interest rates. In addition,
because of the lack of observable information on the risk underlying corporate assets,
creditors are unable to distinguish between good firms (i.e., firms that do not engage in
asset substitution) and bad firms (i.e., firms that engage in asset substitution). Thus, they
tend to pool firms in risk categories and price debt on the basis of the average risk
increase pursued within that category. As a result of this mechanism of debt pricing,
credit capital is inefficiently allocated.
A default duty to creditors, which I conceive as the directors’ obligation not to
increase unilaterally the risk contractually accepted by creditors, and a regime of
textualist interpretation of the debt contract are the legal instruments that I propose to
redress the existing contractual inefficiency. The basic assumption underlying the duty’s
existence is that if directors want to reserve an option to increase the investment’s risk
ex-post, they must pay for it. This requires that they disclose information on the
investment’s underlying risk so that creditors can price that option. By threatening
directors with personal liability for increasing the level of risk accepted by creditors, the
proposed duty would, thus, deter managers from acting opportunistically. Put differently,
it would prevent them from exercising an option for which they have not paid. In
addition, the duty would remedy the current lack of directors’ incentives to disclose
information. Under the rule I propose, to be able to undertake profitable business
opportunities without incurring liability to creditors, managers should opt for disclosure.
Finally, the liability threat would serve as a mechanism to signal credible information.
Knowing that directors bear personal losses for the duty’s breach, creditors would be
induced to deem credible the information made available to them. Thus, the duty’s
overall effect would be to make creditors able to screen firms depending on their specific
risk. This, however, would have only limited effect for inducing creditors to change the

7

The substitution of the firm’s existing assets with riskier assets is also described as overinvestment
when it results in the undertaking of negative net present value projects.
8

Indeed, creditors do not benefit from the potential high expected rewards deriving from the
undertaking of risky projects, because they are entitled only to a fixed payment. If the project fails,
however, they will be the first to bear the consequences of such failure.
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way they price debt. As a matter of economic theory,9 creditors’ payoffs are the same
under a system in which they price debt by pooling good and bad firms together (and
calculate the average risk increase) and in one in which they price debt on the basis of
separating equilibria. For this reason, I argue that, in order to achieve a Pareto
improvement in the market equilibrium, a regime of textualist (or literal) interpretation of
the debt contract should be adopted together with the duty to creditors.
As a default rule of law, the actual scope and content of the duty would be
determined by contract. Parties themselves would set the boundaries of directors’
obligations to creditors depending on the investment’s risk they negotiate. In this context,
adopting a literal interpretative regime of the debt contract would mandate to consider
accepted by creditors any risk they have not contractually excluded or limited. Even if
apparently counterintuitive, the existence of this interpretative rule would prompt a
strategic game between the parties ultimately leading to efficiency. Under such a regime,
creditors would bear the unspecified risk. As a result, they would have incentives to
specify the risk they accept. On the other hand, however, this regime might appear to
induce directors to conceal information. By doing so, directors could limit the risk of
personal liability and reserve additional investment options. Yet, such a behavior would
ultimately prove self-defeating. Uninformed creditors would react by imposing general
covenants. Because of the scarcity of observable information, such covenants would be
low state-contingent on the external state (i.e., the corporate activity).10 This means that
they would tend to exclude a large set of investment options and, therefore, to broaden
directors’ liability. Consequently, rational managers would seek to restrain their liability

9

See ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY (1995 ed.); Jeffrey Banks & Joel Sobel, Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games, 55 ECONOMICA
647 (1987); Charles A. Wilson, The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection, 11 BELL
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 108 (1980); MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING (1974); George G. Akerlof,
The Market for Lemons, 89 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 488 (1970).
10

By low state-contingent covenant, I mean a covenant which tends to provide for a low number of
possible contingencies, such as a covenant establishing that the company must not undertake any new line
of business. On the contrary, a highly state-contingent covenant specifies in detail the parties’ obligations
depending on the possible contingencies which may take place. For instance, rather than a general no-newlines-of-business covenant, the contractual restriction would specify in detail which new activities the
company can or cannot undertake. See Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Magli, Rigidity, Discretion, and the
Cost of Writing Contracts, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 798, 799 (2002). Cf. also Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner,
& Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L.
REV. 91, 108, 122 (2000).
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risk by disclosing information and bargaining for more state-contingent covenants.
Finally, under a textualist interpretative regime, both parties would have incentives to
specify the contract, and creditors would be induced to price debt on the basis of such
specification.
The suggested model would also have the effect of reducing monitoring and
opportunity costs. To begin with, it would serve as a bonding mechanism inducing
directors to fulfill contractual obligations. Because the level of risk accepted by creditors
would be determined by contract, directors would become sort of guarantors of the
company’s obligations concerning creditors’ accepted risk (i.e., CAR). Still, this does not
mean that the breach of the duty would automatically follow the breach of the contract.
Two different kinds of contractual provisions should be distinguished: those setting the
CAR and those establishing the terms of repayment of debt. Directors could be held
liable to creditors only for the breach of a CAR provision that resulted also in the breach
of a provision on the terms of payment. Moreover, the duty would avoid the risk that the
maximization of corporate welfare might be compromised by sub-optimal covenants (i.e.,
not sufficiently state-contingent covenants). Under the current regime, because of the
lack of credible information, creditors tend to draft covenants which inefficiently
constrain managerial discretion. This results in significant opportunity costs for the firm.
By enabling parties to devise optimal covenants (i.e., highly state-contingent covenants),
the duty to creditors would reduce also such costs.11
Finally, the proposed model would eliminate the uncertainty currently surrounding
directors’ fiduciary duties, especially in the case of financial distress of the corporation.12

11

Cf. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond
Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979) (arguing that, for each firm, would exist a unique optimal set of
protective covenants "which maximize[s] the value of the firm.")
12

Much of this uncertainty is due to the “vicinity of insolvency standard”, which was devised by the
Credit Lyonnais decision as the paradigm of the shift of directors’ duties to creditors. See, e.g., Roy de R.
Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of Distressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV.
45, 65-71 (1998); Richard M. Cieri, et al., The Fiduciary Duties Of Directors of Financially Troubled
Companies, 3 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 405, 417-20 (1994); C. Robert Morris, Directors'Duties in Nearly
Insolvent Corporations: A Comment on Credit Lyonnais, 19 J. CORP. L. 61 (1993); Ramesh K.S. Rao,
Fiduciary Duty a la Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective on Corporate Governance In a FinanciallyDistressed Firm, 22 J. CORP. L. 53 (1994); Mike Roberts, The Conundrum of Directors’ Duties in Nearly
Insolvent Corporations, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 273, 286-90 (1993); Gregory V. Varallo and Jesse A.
Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of the Financially Troubled Company, 48 BUS. LAW. 239
(1992).
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Under this model, as long as they respect the boundaries of the contract, directors are free
to pursue any strategy they might deem beneficial, regardless of the company’s financial
conditions. Thus, the duty would exclude that the fear of liability’s exposure might
paralyze managers’ decision-making when their resolute action is most needed. From this
perspective, my proposal would set the parties free to negotiate privately the allocation of
risk that maximizes the value of their exchange. (Following this logic, the parties could
permit directors to undertake risky corporate projects even in the case of financial distress
of the corporation. Similarly, the parties could decide to exclude the duty altogether.)
This would increase efficiency, since the contracting parties are in the best position to
devise the optimal risk allocation. Also for this reason the contract should be interpreted
literally: to avoid that the court’s subjective interpretation of creditors’ accepted risk
might inject uncertainty in legal relationships and reduce the expected value of the
parties’ exchange.13
In Part I of this essay, I offer a critical assessment of the dominant academic views
of directors’ duty to creditors and illustrate the reasons of the present inadequacy of the
debt contract to govern the parties’ relationship pursuant to a welfare maximization
criterion. In Part II, I discuss the positive elaborations of the duty to creditors formulated
by the corporate constituency statutes and the Credit Lyonnais decision. In particular, in
the context of the discussion on Credit Lyonnais, I explain why the insolvency exception
is an incomplete doctrine of directors’ duty to creditors and why the net present value test
devised by the Lyonnais court is an inefficient test of directors’ liability. In Part III, I
expound the new model of corporate fiduciary law I propose. First, I describe the
function of the proposed default duty to creditors and clarify why a legal intervention for
a diverse distribution of the parties’ entitlements is necessary. Second, I illustrate the
mechanism of contractual determination of the default duty and explain why it would
serve as a bonding mechanism inducing directors to fulfill the contract. Third, I clarify

13

See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 5, 549-50 (arguing that textualist interpretation maximizes the
ex-ante value of contractual relationships). See also Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An
Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 277, 280 (1992)
(affirming that, because of the non-verifiability of parties’ information, courts are not able to enforce valuemaximizing terms and, thereby, suggesting that a textualist approach to contract interpretation would be
more efficient).
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how the interaction between duty and textualist interpretation of the contract would lead
to a Pareto improvement in the credit market equilibrium. Fourth, I set out the several
options that the proposed model would offer to the company’s directors for escaping
liability. Fifth, I explain why only creditors-capital providers should be owed a default
directors’ duty. Sixth, I make some policy considerations as to the effect of directors’
liability insurance over the contractual determination of the duty and the firm’s capital
structure. Finally, in the Conclusion, I summarize why my proposal is desirable.

PART I
THE CURRENT STATUS

OF THE

DEBATE

ON

DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARIES DUTIES

TO

CREDITORS
1. The Rather Different Views of Contractarians and Communitarians
Fiduciary law has been defined as “one of the most elusive concepts in AngloAmerican law.”14 This seems especially true in the case of corporate fiduciary law. While
it is common knowledge that directors (and other corporate officers)15 owe a duty of care
and a duty of loyalty to the corporation, not much else is uncontroversial in this field. The
fierce academic debate and the large number of judicial opinions that have focused on
directors’ duties attest to the complexity of the matter.
In particular, in the past twenty years, commentators have widely discussed
whether directors, in pursuing the corporate benefit, should take into account also the
interests of company creditors.16 Two dominant views have emerged from such a debate:

14

Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J.
879, 879 (1988).
15

This essay, however, will not discuss the duties and responsibilities of corporate officers because
of the too vast array of offices that, depending on the size of the corporation, such a qualification may
cover. For instance, in merchant banks, nearly everybody above the employee-level tends to be
denominated a vice-president. This qualification, however, does not imply any of the traditional powers
attributed to corporate officers. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 3.1.1, 180 (2003) (quoting
Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Livingston, 566 F.2d. 1119 (9th Cir. 1978)).
16

The problem of the beneficiary of directors’ fiduciary duties finds its origins in the debate around
the excessive formalism of the academic view that considered the corporate entity itself as such a
beneficiary. For some early discussion on the matter, see the debate developed in the 1930s between the
shareholder-centered vision of the corporation backed by Columbia Professor Adolf A. Berle and the
opposed stakeholder-centered perspective supported by Harvard Professor E. Merrick Dodd. See Adolf A.
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those of contractarians and communitarians. Contractarian scholars oppose the extension
of directors’ duties to creditors, arguing that the latter’s interests can be adequately
protected by contract.17 By contrast, communitarians claim that informational and
bargaining disparities make non-shareholders unable to achieve self-protection through
contract.18 In turn, they advocate a multi-fiduciary model19 where all corporate
stakeholders benefit from the attribution of directors’ fiduciary duties.20
Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); and E.
Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
17

From the contractarian perspective, since creditors have only a fixed claim over the corporate
revenues, the contract would be a sufficient instrument to control current and future contingencies, and,
therefore, to ensure the repayment of creditors’ claims. By contrast, as residual claimants, shareholders are
interested in the overall economic performance of the firm and, therefore, “to protect their interests, (…)
[they should] be given the right to control the firm.” Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 449-52
(2001). Under this view, fiduciary duties serve essentially to fill in the unspecified terms of the
shareholders’ corporate contract. In these terms, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
100-101 (3d. ed. 1986); FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 68 (1991); Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 1443-44; Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein,
Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 28-32
(1990); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the
Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991); Jonathan. R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401 (1993);
Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholder, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 34-36
(1996).
18

In particular, employees and lower level corporate officers would be the parties mostly
disadvantaged in terms of contractual bargaining. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as
Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45 (1991); Joseph
W. Singer, Jobs and Justice: Rethinking the Stakeholder Debate, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 475 (1993); Marleen
A. O'
Connor, How Should We Talk About Fiduciary Duty?: Directors'Conflict-of-Interest Transactions
and the ALI'
s Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 954 (1993). More generally,
see Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance: Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1403 (1985).
19

As reported by Professor Bainbridge, the expression multi-fiduciary model was coined by
Professor Green. See Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate
Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1419 (1993) (quoted in Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 1425, fn.
6).
20

Among the scholars embracing such a view of the corporation, see, for example, Melvin A.
Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582 (1985);
Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C.L. REV. 595 (1997); Brudney,
supra note 18; Lyman Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who are They For?, 43 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 781 (1986); Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and
Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865 (1990) [hereinafter, Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary]; Lawrence E.
Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX.
L. REV. 579, 585 (1992) [hereinafter, Mitchell, Corporate Constituency Statutes]; Lawrence E. Mitchell,
The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1990) [hereinafter, Mitchell,
Corporate Bondholders]; David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991)
[hereinafter Millon, Redefining Corporate Law]; David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians and the
Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1373 (1993) [hereinafter Millon, Communitarians,
Contractarians].

- 10 -

These divergent views of directors’ duties are explained by the radically different
conception of the corporate entity of the two groups. For communitarians, the corporation
is a social institution tied to all its diverse components by means of trust and mutual
interdependence.21 Thus, they conceive directors as a means to pursue social welfare and
prevent potential shareholders’ abuses against non-shareholders. Contractarians, instead,
see the corporation as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals
gathered together to the sole purpose of maximizing their profits.22 From this perspective,
the exclusive commitment of directors toward shareholders is viewed as the most
efficient way to achieve the profit-maximization goal.23
2. A Critical Assessment
Both the communitarian and the contractarian theories have been the object of
fierce, reciprocal criticism. In such a dispute, two major arguments have been advanced
by one group against the other. Contractarians claim that the communitarian idea boosts
inefficiency. Communitarians reply that the contractarian view leads to social injustice. 24

21

See, e.g., Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, supra note 20, at 1379-83; David Millon,
Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 261-62 (1990). On the special importance of
trustworthiness among corporate participants, see, among others, Margaret M. Blair & Linn A. Stout, Trust,
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001);
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425 (1993).
22

Although the contractarian theory was developed after the 1980s by legal scholars, its origins can
be traced back to the early 1970s, when the new idea of the firm as a nexus for a set of contracting
relationships among individuals emerged among economists. Among the seminal economic references, see
Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Armen A. Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972);
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975);
Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
23

In this sense, see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 441.

24

For a very detailed analysis of the ideological and political differences between the contractarian
and communitarian visions of the corporation, see Paul N. Cox, The Public, The Private and the
Corporation, 80 MARQU. L. REV. 391 (1997) (speaking of a conflict between the public-egalitarian claim of
communitarians and the private-individualistic claim of contractarians). For a fierce critique of the
communitarian model, see, for example, Bainbridge, supra note 1; and also Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law
Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1995). For a communitarian critique of the contractarian position,
see, among others, Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, supra note 20. For an independent review of
the contractarian view, see also William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives From History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989); and William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of
Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989).
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In this context, one may thus reasonably believe that a rule of directors’ liability to
creditors must necessarily embrace social and/or moral considerations. On the contrary,
my proposal is grounded on a contractarian view of the firm and is designed to increase
corporate and social efficiency.
2.1. The Inefficiency of the Multi-Fiduciary Model
Although I share the communitarian idea that directorial fiduciary duties should not
be a tool at shareholders’ disposal to expropriate wealth from other corporate
constituencies, I dismiss the multi-fiduciary model of directors’ duties as inefficient for
four reasons. First, I argue that should directors maximize creditor value, as advocated by
communitarians, the only choice at their disposal would be to underinvest. This means
that they should avoid any course of action entailing a risk of reducing the assets
available to satisfy creditors’ claims. But corporations need to take risks to exploit
potentially lucrative ventures. Hence, imposing on directors a duty to maximize creditor
value would ultimately result in the reduction of corporate value.
Second, as argued by contractarians, when fiduciary duties are owed to two or more
sets of persons who have conflicting (i.e., not identical) interests, they are so difficult to
administer that they practically become no duties at all. (This is commonly known as the
too many masters argument.)25 Thus, should directors owe duties to all stakeholders, not
only would they be able to exercise unfettered discretion, but they are also likely to
become self-serving. Directors could justify virtually any of their actions on the basis of
the benefits accruing to one or the other group of corporate constituents.26
Third, the multi-fiduciary model would tend to increase litigation since a larger
25

However, among the same contractarians, some have noticed that the too many masters argument
is overstated nowadays. Modern corporations are characterized by a multilayered structure that counts not
only different classes of stakeholders, but also multiple classes of common and preferred stock. And the
interests of these different classes of stockholders may conflict as can the interests of one class of
stakeholders with the other. Yet, directors have traditionally been able to manage their duties to the
different categories of stockholders in ways beneficial to the corporation. See Macey, supra note 17, at 33.
In addition, modern financial instruments have further complicated the corporate scenario. In particular, as
regards directors’ duties, hybrid securities (i.e., securities having both characteristics of debt and equity)
pose problems which are analogous to those implied by a potential extension of such duties to creditors. Cf.
Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, The Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of
Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1273 (1991) (who argues that the increasing complexity of the
corporate capital structure might challenge shareholder primacy in the future.)
26

In this terms, see, for example, Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 412; William J. Carney, Does
Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385, 424 (1990).
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number of parties would have title to commence legal action against directors for the
perceived breach of fiduciary duties. As a result, the judicial system would risk being
slowed down by the increase in law suits against directors. Moreover, litigation could be
abused by creditors seeking to extract extra-profits from debtor companies.
Finally, the interests of corporate constituencies other than shareholders and
creditors are protected by specific areas of law. For instance, employees’ rights are
secured by labor law; those of consumers, by consumer law; and so on. Hence, directors’
action in favor of these other constituencies could overlap the specific legal means of
protection at the latter’s disposal. This would be likely to generate more damage than
benefits.
2.2. The Limit of the Contractarian Perspective
Endorsing a contractarian view of the corporation, I maintain that creditors’ rights,
including any obligations directors might bear toward them, should be determined by
contract. I also claim, however, that, under the current model of corporate governance,
managerial opportunism and informational asymmetry compromise parties’ ability to
write optimal debt contracts, which regulate the debtor-creditor relationship pursuant to a
welfare-maximization criterion.27
From an economic viewpoint, the problem arises from the intrinsic conflict
between shareholders and creditors. Because of their limited liability for corporate
obligations, as a corporation incurs indebtedness, shareholders have incentives to design
the firm’s operating characteristics and financial structure in ways that maximize their
benefit to the detriment of creditors.28 The shareholder primacy rule, then, extends these

27

See supra note 5.

28

Among the seminal works on the shareholder-creditor conflict, see Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 22, at 308 (first to suggest that an owner-manager, who issues debt before deciding on the investment
policy, can transfer wealth to himself from bondholders by taking on excessive risk); Smith & Warner,
supra note 11 (analyzing the efficacy of the debt contract to solve the conflict). See also Fischer Black &
John C. Cox, Valuing Corporate Securities: Some Effects of Bond Indenture Provisions, 31 J. FIN. 351
(1976); Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977); Merton H.
Miller, The Wealth Transfers of Bankruptcy-Some Illustrative Examples, 41 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 39 (1977); Eugene F. Fama, The Effect of a Firm’s Investment and Financing Decisions on the
Welfare of Its Security Holders, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 272 (1978).
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incentives to managers.29 Rational creditors, however, anticipate this risk and specify ex
ante contractual provisions to prevent it. In particular, debt contracts are designed to
regulate three main sources of conflict between shareholders and creditors: (i) dividend
payment–the expropriation of creditor value determined by the pay-out of corporate
assets, in form of dividends, to shareholders; (ii) claim dilution–the devaluing of prior
debt by the issuance of subsequent debt; and (iii) asset substitution–the substitution of
riskier assets to the firm’s existing assets. 30
I argue, however, that while the debt contract is effective in controlling the first two
sources of conflict, it fails to curb the managerial tendency to engage in asset
substitution–i.e., managerial opportunism.31 Unlike dividend payment and claim dilution,
asset substitution cannot be prevented through the imposition of readily verifiable

29

Theoretically, managers would be more risk averse than shareholders. Unlike the latter, who can
diversify their investments, managers typically make specific investments in one firm. From this
perspective, they are also exposed to a significant risk of reputational capital depreciation for the failure of
corporate projects. In addition, like creditors, managers do not participate in the upside potential of
corporate projects. As a matter of fact, however, managers’ position tends to be aligned to those of
shareholders. First, the shareholder primacy rule makes managers liable to shareholders and, therefore, give
them incentives to pursue shareholders’ interests. See, e.g., Smith & Warner, supra note 11, at 118 (arguing
that managers might behave opportunistically “acting in the stockholders’ interest”); Myers, supra note 28,
at 149 (referring to “firm with risky debt outstanding, and which act in its stockholders’ interests”). Second,
in the modern corporation, the interest of managers and shareholders tend to be aligned as a result of
equity-based compensation plans; e.g., stock options. See, e.g., Günter Strobl, Managerial Compensation,
Market Liquidity, and the Overinvestment Problem, The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania
Working Paper 31, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=567085 (last visited February 2,
2005); Ming Nmi Fang & Rui Zhong, Default Risk, Firm’s Characteristics, and Risk Shifting, YALE ICF
WORKING PAPER N. 04-21, May 1, 2004; Ajay Subramanian, Managerial Flexibility, Agency Costs and
Optimal Capital Structure, (January 2002), AFA 2003 Washington, DC Meetings.
30

Directors, acting on behalf of shareholders, are induced to adopt increasingly risky corporate
strategies. At the extreme, they might even have incentives to undertake strategies having a negative net
present value. This is commonly known as overinvestment. Equally, directors might be induced to reject
positive net present value projects simply because the benefits of such projects would accrue exclusively to
the firm'
s bondholders; in such a case, financial theorists talk about underinvestment. The result of
overinvestment and underinvestment, however, is identical. Both transfer wealth from creditors to
shareholders.
31

Cf. Smith & Warner supra note 11, at 153 (arguing that “to go very far in directly restraining the
firm’s production/investment policy” might prove inefficient and proposing to use dividend policy and
financing policy restrictions to indirectly curb the problem of managerial opportunism. Such a solution,
however, might imply extremely high opportunity costs). See also Myer, supra note 28, at 161-62
(confirming that contractual solutions to the asset substitution problem might be so costly to be unfeasible).
For an analysis limited to the case of bondholders, see also Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and
Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 236-238 (1988) (arguing that bond covenants are inadequate to protect
bondholders from the risk of value expropriation arising from managerial opportunism).
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financial parameters.32 Instead, to bargain for the right investment policy restrictions,
creditors need detailed information on the investment’s underlying risk. Yet, the
informational asymmetry between managers and creditors, paired to the existing
shareholder-centered model of corporate governance, makes it unlikely that creditors may
have such information (and/or can rely on it).33
Informational asymmetry takes place when information is differently observable to
parties.34 Thus, in the relationship between managers and creditors, the former have
information on the investment’s underlying risk that is not observable to the latter. Being
held to the exclusive maximization of share value, managers then have no incentives to
disclose this information to creditors. On the contrary, they might well be induced to
conceal it to borrow at a lower cost and reserve a costless option to invest in riskier
projects. In addition, because creditors expect managers to act in shareholders’ interest,
they might be reluctant to consider disclosed information credible.35
As a consequence, creditors would draft sub-optimal covenants, which fail to
maximize the ex-ante value of the parties’ relationship. In particular, they would tend to
bargain for general, rather than analytical covenants. General covenants limit the firm’s

32

The breach of accounting and financial covenants, which are designed to control, respectively, the
problems of dividend payment and claim dilution, would always involve an explicit act (like, for instance,
the payment of dividends in violation of a provision requiring the previous deposit by the debtor of a
specified amount as cash reserve). Consequently, their breach would be readily observable and verifiable
by creditors. In practice, however, ascertaining the violation of these types of covenants might prove more
difficult than it might prima facie appear. First, there would be “many possible channels for transferring
capital to the firm’s owners.” See Myers, supra note 28, at 160 (quoting Jensen & Meckling, supra note
22). In addition, as evidenced by the recent wave of corporate scandals, inefficiencies in the gatekeeping
system might make it difficult to verify the breach of the financial parameters established by the parties.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Legal Reforms, 84
B.U. L. REV. 101 (2004).
33

Even if creditors might have (some) information on the current status of corporate assets, they
commonly lack ex-ante information on the projected risk of the firm, which is what really matters to price
debt.
34

The seminal work on the problem of asymmetric information is that of George G. Akerlof. See
Akerlof, supra note 9. The result of the asymmetric information between market participants is that market
equilibria often fail to be Pareto optimal. In turn, adverse selection problems may arise.
35

For the same reason, managers’ information might not be totally credible even if made observable
to creditors by gatekeepers (i.e., auditors, securities analysts, investment bankers, etc.). This seems
especially true after the wave of corporate scandals and accounting irregularities that have shaken the
trustworthiness of the gatekeeping system in the past few years.
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investment policy by providing for low state-contingent restrictions,36 such as the
obligation not to engage in new lines of business. Such covenants offer the advantage of
being easily verifiable, but bear high opportunity costs for the debtor. They are, thus,
inefficient.37 Analytical covenants, instead, specify in details the courses of action that
managers can or cannot undertake (that is, they are more state-contingent on the external
state). Hence, such covenants deter managerial opportunism at a lower opportunity cost.
However, being not as easily verifiable as general contractual restrictions, they tend to
imply higher monitoring costs. To enforce this type of covenants, creditors need updated
information on the investment’s risk and the corporate activity, which is both expensive
and difficult to gather. Indeed, managers have even stronger incentives not to disclose
private information when such a disclosure may trigger a contractual breach.38 Finally,
absent a bonding mechanism inducing directors to fulfill the contract, even analytical
covenants would not be efficient in governing managerial opportunism. 39
The matter, however, is not only about the contract’s failure to govern the asset
substitution problem efficiently. Anticipating this failure, creditors charge higher interest

36

See supra note 10.

37

This analysis of general covenants presupposes a textualist interpretative regime of the debt
contract. Under such a regime, imposing a general limit on a specific corporate activity is equivalent to
forbid that activity altogether. This means that in the case, for instance, of a no-change-of-business-line
covenant, the debtor could not undertake any different activity from the one carried out at bargaining, even
though the change of activity was not substantial. Instead, under a contextualist interpretative regime,
general covenants become generic covenants. Indeed, under such a diverse regime, contractual provisions
that are low state-contingent may result more or less restrictive than analytical covenants (which are per se
more state-contingent) depending on the ex-post interpretation of the third adjudicator. For instance, the
conversion of part of a company’s industrial production from automobiles to scooters could be held not to
represent a violation of a no-change-of-business-line covenant under a contextualist interpretative regime.
It follows that generic covenants entail lower opportunity costs than general covenants. Yet, they bear high
uncertainty costs, which are the costs arising out of the uncertainty over the ex-post completion of the
contract by the third adjudicator. See also infra Part III, Par. 3.
38

For this reason, under the current regime, creditors tend to discover the undertaking of asset
substitution projects only on the verge of insolvency, when it is commonly too late to rescue their position.
In addition, some empirical studies confirm that even when creditors are informed on the asset substitution
carried out by managers, they often prefer not to bring legal action against the company. Under the current
regime of corporate fiduciary law, the costs and uncertainty of the contract’s enforcement would, indeed,
induce creditors to prefer renegotiation or other out of court settlements to the judicial enforcement of the
contract. See Kevin C.W. Chen & K.C. John Wei, Creditors’ Decisions to Waive Violations of Accounting
Based Covenants, 68 THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW 218 (1993).
39

See Raghuram G. Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor,
50 J. FIN. 1113 (1995) (providing evidence that since restrictive covenants are, in practice, often inefficient,
creditors frequently write covenants loosely by using standard boilerplate).
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rates.40 In addition, because of the scarcity of observable information and credible signals
on the risk underlying corporate assets, creditors are unable to distinguish good firms
(i.e., firms that do not engage in asset substitution) from bad firms (i.e., firms that engage
in asset substitution). Thus, they tend to pool firms in risk categories and price debt on
the basis of the average risk of each category.41 As a consequence, credit capital is
inefficiently allocated and social costs arise. First, good firms end up subsidizing bad
firms. Second, the pooling equilibrium between good and bad firms may create adverseselection problems.42 Firms pursuing a below-the-average level of asset substitution
might be so penalized by the current mechanism of debt pricing as to drop out of the
market. Firms pursuing an above-the-average level of asset substitution, instead, would
profit from such a mechanism and have all the incentives to stay in the market. Moreover,
beyond a certain level of risk, creditors may start to offer less aggregate credit,43 with the
consequence that good firms (and good business projects) might risk going unfunded.

PART II
THE POSITIVE ANALYSIS
1. The Corporate Constituency Statutes
The American legislator has not remained indifferent to the debate on corporate
fiduciary duties. Since the 1980s, some thirty American states have enacted statutes,

40

See Richard Green & Eli Talmor, Asset Substitution and the Agency Costs of Debt Financing, 10
J. BANK. & FIN. 391 (1986); Hayne E. Leland, Risky Debt, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure,
49 J. FIN. 1213 (1994); Hayne E. Leland & Klaus Bjerre Toft, Optimal Capital Structure, Endogenous
Bankruptcy, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads, 51 J. FIN. 987 (1996); Hayne E. Leland, Agency
Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure, 49 J. FIN. 1213 (1998); Jan Ericsson, Asset Substitution,
Debt Pricing, Optimal Leverage and Optimal Maturity, FINANCE 21 (2000).
41

Indeed, in credit markets, only debtors can observe the quality of the claims they sell. By contrast,
creditors can observe just the distribution of the quality of the claims that have been issued. As a result, the
expected value of financial claims is calculated on the average risk. For an empirical study, see, e.g., Artur
Morgado & Julio Pindado, The Underinvestment and Overinvestment Hypotheses: An Analysis Using Panel
Data, 9 EUROP. FIN. MANAG. 163, 165 (2003). Cf. also Ericsson, supra note 38.
42

In general terms, adverse selection arises when the trading decisions of informed market
participants depend on privately held information in a manner that may adversely affect uninformed market
participants. In the case in question, this means that bad firms will tend to be more willing to bear the
average increase of the cost of debt determined by the pooling equilibrium than good firms.
43

See, e.g., Ericsson, supra note 38, at 27 (showing that firms could afford to take an additional
20% of leverage if the incentives to alter the firm’s riskiness were not present).
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largely known as corporate constituency statutes,44 which authorize directors to consider
also non-shareholder interests in the corporate decision-making.45 Most of these statutes,
however, do not mandate, but simply permit the consideration of the interests of
employees, creditors, local communities, and other corporate constituencies. The only
notable exception is represented by the Connecticut’s statute, which expressly requires
directors to consider non-shareholder interests in the management of the corporation.46
This discretionary feature of the statutes, paired with their often vague formulation,
has raised doubts as to the impact of such legislation on directors’ fiduciary obligations.

44

statutes.

Alternatively, the statutes are also known as non-shareholder or non-stockholder constituency

45

As reported by the American Bar Association, the statutes typically include one or more of the
following provisions:
(1) Directors may consider the interests of, or the effects of their action on, various nonstockholder constituencies. (2) These constituencies may include employees, customers, creditors,
suppliers, and communities in which the corporation has facilities. (3) Directors may consider the
national and state economies and other community and societal considerations. (4) Directors may
consider the long-term as well as the short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders.
(5) Directors may consider the possibility that the best interests of the corporation and its
stockholders may best be served by remaining independent. (6) Directors may consider any other
pertinent factors. (7) Officers may also be covered.
See American Bar Association (ABA), Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies
Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2261 (1990) [hereinafter ABA Committee on
Corporate Laws]. Among the several states that have adopted corporate constituency statutes, see, ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §10-1202(A) (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West 1990); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607-111(9) (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(5) (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35(b) (1990);
IDAHO CODE § 30-1602 (Michie 1990); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 32/8-85 (West 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 231-35-1(d)(f)(g) (West 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490-1108 (West 1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12210(4) (Michie 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-92(G) (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716
(West 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A-251(5)
(West 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30 (1990); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351-347 (West 1991); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 21-2035(l) (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-14(4) (West 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D)
(Michie 1989); N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 717(b) (1991); OHIO REV.CODE ANN. § 1701-59 (West 1989); OR. REV.
STAT. § 60.357(5) (1989); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § § 511(d), (e), (g) & 1721(e), (f), (g) (West 1990); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-33-4 (Michie 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. §
48-35-204 (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.305 (West 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-16-830 (Mich 1989).
46

The Connecticut statute provides that a director “shall consider (…) (3) the interests of the
corporation'
s employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, and (4) community and societal considerations
including those of any community in which any office or other facility of the corporation is located.”
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp.1990). It should be noted, however, that even though the
Indiana’s statute does not compel directors to consider non-shareholder interests, its wording is difficultly
reconcilable with the idea of shareholder primacy. The statute gives directors “full discretion” in the
selection of the corporate interests to pursue and specifies that they may weight each group of interest “as
they deem appropriate.” In addition, it also provides that directors “are not required to consider the effects
of a proposed corporate action on any particular corporate constituent group or interest as a dominant or
controlling factor.” See IND. CODE ANN. § § 23-1-35-1(d) (f) (g) (West 1989).
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Once again, communitarians and contractarians have supported opposite views. For the
former, the statutes represent a desirable first step toward a new egalitarian model of
corporate law, in which social welfare maximization takes the place of share value
maximization as the fundamental corporate governance rule.47 For contractarians, instead,
the statutes are “an idea whose time should never have come.”48 Hence, they should be
interpreted restrictively.49 This means that non-shareholder interests should be taken into
consideration only when a simultaneous benefit accrues to shareholders.50 Only in this
way, would the risk be avoided that incumbent directors might undertake self-driven
decisions adducing uncertain non-shareholder interests.
Although in existing law there is no evidence for a communitarian-like
interpretation of the statutes, I agree that they are part of a broader trend suggesting a
need to review the traditional shareholder centered vision of the corporation.51 The
openness to the case of non-shareholders showed in some circumstances by Delaware
courts,52 the most influential corporate law courts in this country, could also be regarded

47

In this sense, see, among others, Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 20; Johnson, The
Delaware Judiciary, supra note 20; Mitchell, Corporate Constituency Statutes, supra note 20; Marleen
O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus on Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect
Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991).
48

James. J. Hanks, Jr., Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes: An Idea Whose Time Should Never
Come, 3 INSIGHTS 20 (1989).
49

See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 17; DeBow & Lee, supra note 1, at 398-405; Hanks, supra
note 48; James. J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21
STETSON L. REV. 97 (1991); James. J. Hanks Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and
Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1230 (1988).
50

See ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 45, at 2268 (1990) (“The Committee
believes that the better interpretation of these statutes, and one that avoids … consequences [on corporate
efficiency] is that they confirm what the common law has been: directors must take into account the
interests of other constituencies but only as and to the extent that the directors are acting in the best
interests, …, of the shareholders and the corporation.”)
51

In similar terms, but advocating a communitarian-oriented reading of this trend, see Mitchell,
Corporate Constituency Statutes, supra note 20, at 585, who observes that the statutes are “part of a trend
suggesting a need for legal recognition of constituent interests within the corporate structure.” In my idea,
instead, the statutes would signal a more limited need for reviewing, not rebutting, the shareholder primacy
rule.
52

See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (in which the court
dismissed a shareholder derivative action against the company directors, stating that the adoption of antitakeover measures could be justified by the consideration of the interests of “'
constituencies'other than
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)");
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990) (in which the court upheld the
decision of Time’s directors to prefer uncertain long-term strategies over short-term shareholders’ gains, on
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as part of this trend (especially if one considers that Delaware does not belong to the list
of states that have enacted corporate constituency statutes). As a matter of positive law,
however, the turning moment of the debate on directors’ duties to creditors has been the
1991 Credit Lyonnais decision.
2. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.
2.1. From the Insolvency Exception to the Financial Distress Exception
Traditionally, the insolvency exception has represented the only circumstance under
which American courts have acknowledged a duty of directors to creditors. Indeed, the
idea that corporate insolvency shifts directorial duties toward creditors can be traced back
to the trust fund doctrine of early American corporate law,53 which established that the
corporate assets of a company facing dissolution were to be held in trust for the benefit of
its creditors.54 From an economic viewpoint, the exception finds its justification in the
fact that, when a corporation becomes insolvent, the position of creditors and
shareholders exchange, with the former taking the place of the latter as the parties having
an equitable interest in the corporate assets.55
the basis of the board’s duties to maintain the company as an independent enterprise and to protect “Time
culture”); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp, 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1985) (affirming the right of
directors to refuse an hostile bid on the ground of the consideration of “broad corporate interests”); TW
Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94334 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (upholding the defensive measures adopted by the board in a hostile takeover context, on
the basis of the consideration of the “shareholder long-term interests or '
corporate entity interests'or '
multiconstituency interests'
” as opposed to the “'
shareholder short term interests'or '
current share value
interests'
”).
53

On the trust fund doctrine, see, among others, Joseph J. Norton, Relationship of Shareholders to
Corporate Creditors upon Dissolution: Nature and Implications of the “Trust Fund” Doctrine of
Corporate Assets, 30 BUS. LAW. 1061 (1975); Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., Does a Corporation’s Board of
Directors owe a Fiduciary Duty to Its Creditors?, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 589 (1994); Stephen R. McDonnell,
Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., Insolvency Shift Directors’ Burden from Shareholder to Creditors, 19
DEL. J. CORP. 177, 186-95 (1994); Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reexamining the Fiduciary Paradigm at
Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors’ Duties to Creditors, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. REV. 1,
76-87 (1995). Among the very earliest comments on the doctrine, see JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE, Chs. 3, 33, 43 (1886); Note, The “Trust Fund” Theory, 9 HARV. L. REV. 481 (1896).
54

The leading case of the trust fund doctrine is Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me.
1824). Other well known early cases include Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., U.S. 371 (1893);
Mackenzie Oil Co. v. Omar Oil & Gas Co., 120 A. 852 (Del. Ch. 1923); and Asmussen v. Quaker City
Corp., 156 A. 180 (Del. Ch. 1931).
55

See Stephen L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation'
s Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L.
REV. 647, 667 (1996) (assimilating creditors’ rights upon insolvency to that of shareholders of solvent
corporations); Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors'
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In 1991, however, a decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery, Credit Lyonnais
Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.,56 announced that "[a]t least
where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not
merely the agent of the residual risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate
enterprise."57 And in the court’s opinion the concept of corporate enterprise would
encompass “the community of interest[s] that sustained the corporation”,58 including
creditors’ interests. Then, in a now-famous footnote, the court explained why creditors
should benefit from the attribution of directors’ fiduciary duty under such circumstances:
“"[t]he possibility of insolvency can do curious things to incentives, exposing creditors to
risks of opportunistic behavior and creating complexities for directors."59
By hinting at the problem of managerial opportunism, the elaboration of directors’
duty to creditors formulated in the Lyonnais decision has represented a step forward
compared to the traditional insolvency exception approach.60 What the Lyonnais court
Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1491 (1993) (defining creditors of insolvent corporations as
new residual claimants of the firm); Cristopher. L. Barnett, Healthco and the “Insolvency Exception”: An
Unnecessary Expansion of the Doctrine?, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 441, 450-51 (2000) (arguing that, upon
insolvency, the rights of shareholders and creditors exchange).
56

Credit Lyonnais, supra note 4. The factual circumstances of the case involved a legal suit
commenced by the company’s creditors for defending their rights under a restructuring plan and, in
particular, the validity of certain provisions that excluded the major shareholder from the management and
control of the corporate activity. For a detailed account of the case, see, among others, Schwarcz, supra
note 55, at 667; Lipson, supra note 1, at 1208-11; Vladimir Jelisavcic, Corporate Law-A Safe Harbor
Proposal to Define the Limits of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties to Creditors in the “Vicinity of Insolvency”:
Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe, 18 J. CORP. L. 145, 153-58 (1992).
57

Credit Lyonnais, supra note 4, at 1155.

58

Id., at 1156. Which corporate constituencies belong to the “corporation’s community of
interest[s]” and how directors should balance these different interests has been largely debated among
commentators. There seem to be no doubts, however, that the ambiguous expression used by the Lyonnais
court intended to include corporate creditors.
59

Id., fn. 55

60

Not surprisingly, the decision has caused upheaval and been extensively reviewed by corporate
scholars. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Court Has a New Idea on Directors’ Duty, 1992 NAT’L L.J. 18
(1992); Lipson, supra note 1, 1208-12; Barondes, supra note 12, at 63-83; Cieri et al., supra note 12, at
417-20; Rima F. Hartman, Situation-Specific Fiduciary Duties for Corporate Directors: Enforceable
Obligations or Toothless Ideals?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1761 (1993); Jelisavcic, supra note 56, at 15358; McDonnell, supra note 53; Morris, supra note 12; Rao, supra note 12; Lin, supra note 55, at 1521-23;
Barnett, supra note 55, at 451-56; Roberts, supra note 12, at 286-90; Varallo and Finkelstein, supra note
12; Daniel J. Winnike, Credit Lyonnais: An Aberration or an Enhancement of Creditors’ Rights in
Delaware?, 6 No. INSIGHTS 31 (1992). The new view of directors’ fiduciary duty outlined in Credit
Lyonnais was successively confirmed by the decisions in Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'
ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787
(Del. Ch. 1992); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v. Reliance Capital
Group (In re Buckhead Am. Corp.), 178 B.R. 956, 968 (D. Del. 1994); Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re
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has overlooked, however, is that a corporation does not need to be in financial distress
(i.e., “in the vicinity of insolvency”) for the risk of managerial opportunism to arise. As
discussed above,61 as long as a firm has outstanding debt, its managers will have
incentives to behave opportunistically. Financial distress would merely increase such
incentives.62 Therefore, in contrast to most commentators, I argue that the problem with
the Credit Lyonnais opinion does not lie in the uncertainty of the vicinity of insolvency
standard,63 but rather in that this opinion still conceives of the duty to creditors as shifting
upon a determined condition (or its vicinity). If the need for such duty is justified by the
risk of managerial opportunism, as the Lyonnais court seems to suggest, creditors should
Healthco Int'
l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 300 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997); Miramar Res., Inc. v. Schultz (In re
Schultz), 208 B.R. 723, 729 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Hechinger
Inv. Co. of Del. v. Fleet Retail Fin. Group (In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del.), 274 B.R. 71, 89 (D. Del.
2002).
61

See supra Part I, Par. 2.2.
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See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1553 (2004); Barry
Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 576-77
(1995); Katherine H. Daigle & Michael T. Maloney, Residual Claims in Bankruptcy: An Agency Theory
Explanation, 37 J.L. & ECON. 157, 157 (1994); Lin, supra note 55, at 1488-91; Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 684 (1993). But see Barondes, supra note 12, at 48-63. Barondes
argues that covenants directly restricting the firm’s investment policy, in concurrence with financial
covenants that indirectly do so, deter excessive risk-taking by financially-distressed firms. For a discussion
of the problems affecting investment policy restrictions, see supra Part I, Par. 2.2. As to the role played by
financial covenants, instead, Barondes’ analysis seems to neglect that, in most cases, creditors’ threat of
accelerating the loan might harm rather than benefit them by leading to a paralysis of the cash flaws
production. As a result, such a threat would tend to be not very credible and rather ineffective in preventing
overinvestment. It seems, therefore, unlikely that “creditors of firms that are nearly insolvent … may have
an incentive to cause the covenants to be triggered.” As a matter of practice, creditors cover the risk of a
downfall in the interest rate applied to debtors’ loans through other legal instruments, such as hedge
contracts. In addition, the empirical data offered by Barondes would not be decisive in proving the lack of
incentives to overinvest of financially distressed firms’ managers. What matters is not that “only forty-six
percent [in a survey of reorganized or liquidated firms] … ‘had made acquisitions or started new
ventures’”, but rather which was the average level of asset substitution undertaken by this forty-six percent.
As previously discussed, creditors would not be able distinguish between good and bad firms, but tend to
price debt by pooling firms together and calculating the average risk. Thus, that forty-six percent (which,
anyway, does not seem a low number) would, in fact, have determined an increase in the cost of debt for all
firms. See supra Part I, Par. 2.2.
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Most of the criticisms moved against the Lyonnais decision have focused on the “vicinity of
insolvency” standard, arguing that it creates uncertainty and ambiguity both as to its timing and scope. See,
e.g., Lipson, supra note 1, at 1208 (holding that “Credit Lyonnais moved beyond the event/condition
paradigm to an unmapped (perhaps unmappable) coordinate”); Conaway Stilson, supra note 53, at 64
(claiming that imposing such a duty on directors of “nearly insolvent corporations provides fertile ground
for Monday-morning quarterbacking by competing corporate constituencies”); Schwarcz, supra note 55, at
672 (claiming that the vicinity of insolvency standard is too difficult to define and evaluate); Barnett, supra
note 60, at 465 (defining the vicinity of insolvency standard as a “fuzzy concept”); Rao, supra note 12, at
62-64 (taking of the vicinity of insolvency standard as “a phrase without any clear significance”).
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be entitled to it beginning with the signing of the credit agreement, because directors’
incentives to behave opportunistically start in that moment.
2.2. The Inadequacy of the NPV Test
The major flaw of Credit Lyonnais, however, is the test of directors’ liability it
suggests. Pursuant to the analysis carried out by the court, to avoid liability to creditors,
directors of distressed corporations should undertake only corporate projects with a
positive net present value (NPV).64 In the court’s opinion, by barring investments that
might reduce the overall value of the firm, such a liability rule would “maximize the
corporation'
s long-term wealth creating capacity.”65 I argue, by contrast, that not only
does the NPV test fail to maximize corporate value, but it is an inadequate test of
directors’ conduct. There are three basic reasons for my claims. First, the NPV test does
not consider the effects that a change in the investment’s level of risk may have on
creditor value. Second, it ignores the option value that is (almost always) embedded in
corporate investments. Third, it neglects the fact that creditors do accept a certain
investment’s risk at signing.
Changes in the risk level of corporate projects might transfer wealth from
creditors to shareholders even though these projects have the same net present value.66 It
is, indeed, apparent that an investment in a high-tech startup yields much different
prospects for creditor value than an investment in government bonds although the face
value of the two investments is the same. This holds true not just for risk-free
investments, but for any change in the risk-level of corporate projects. The NPV test,
then, is of no use for choosing among a range of opportunities having all the same gross
value, but different volatility. More significantly, the test may result in inefficient
corporate decisions. On the one hand, the test may promote, rather than deter, managerial
64

Credit Lyonnais, supra note 4, at 1156, fn. 55. The court’s hypothetical illustrating the NPV test
assumes a solvent corporation with a sole asset, an appeal judgment for $51M, and outstanding bonds for
$12M. The decision’s possible outcomes include a 25% chance of affirmance, a 70% chance of a payment
of $ 4M, and a 5% chance of reversal, resulting in an expected value of litigation of $15.5M. The company
directors, however, also receive two different cash offers to settle, respectively for $12.5M and $17.5M.
Pursuant to the court’s test, directors that consider “the community of interests that the corporation
represents”, rather than the sole shareholders’ interests, would “accept the best settlement offer available
providing it is greater than $ 15.55 million”, that is, any offer increasing the overall firm value.
65

Id., at 1157.
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In similar terms, see also Morris, supra note 12, at 64-7.
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opportunism since it induces directors to pursue projects with a high NPV regardless of
their risk profile.67 On the other hand, by overlooking the option components of corporate
investments, the test may lead to forfeiting valuable business opportunities. As well
known to finance theorists, corporate projects can be better evaluated by looking at them
as including hidden options (on timing, expansion, closing, flexibility, etc.), and by
applying pricing theory to evaluate the implicit value of those options,68 than by adopting
traditional valuation theories, such as the NPV analysis. Indeed, even investment with a
negative NPV may be profitable if evaluated through the real options technique of capital
budgeting.

69

Similarly, investments with lower NPV may actually be superior if their

option components are taken into consideration. 70
Finally, the NPV test fails to consider that creditors do accept a certain level of
risk when they conclude their contract with the corporation, and that they price capital
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Imagine, for instance, that the possible outcomes of the appeal in the Lyonnais hypothetical
include only a 35% chance of affirmance and a 65% chance of reversal. In this case, the litigation
alternative would have an expected value of $17.85M. Thus, pursuant to the NPV test, the company
directors should reject both settlement offers and go to court. In so doing, however, the directors would
effectively accept a bet having the 65% chance of wasting both shareholders’ and creditors’ investment.
Not exactly what one would expect from a liability rule that, in the words of one eminent commentator,
should “minimize the social waste from the perverse incentive to gamble on the doorstep of insolvency.”
See Coffee, supra note 60, at text following fn. 22.
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Option theory (OT), which begins with the development in 1973 of the Black and Scholes model
to calculate the value of a stock option, individuates five fundamental determinants to evaluate an option:
(i) value of the underlying asset, (ii) time to maturity, (iii) interest rate, (iv) exercise price, and (v) volatility
of the underlying assets. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973). Since the development of the Black and Scholes formula,
however, OT has been held relevant to almost any area of finance. For instance, by re-classifying
shareholders of a firm that has issued debt as holders of a call option to buy back the firm’s assets on the
debt maturity, OT permits to illustrate the perverse incentives shareholders may have to increase the value
of their option simply by increasing the volatility of the underlying assets. See generally RONAL J. GILSON
& BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 231-51 (1993). On real
options, see also RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 61639 (2003 ed.). Cf. also George Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries
of Firms, Collateral, and Trust s in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102,
1103 (2004) (arguing that managerial flexibility, intended as option to switch, can prove very valuable).
For an illuminating discussion on the application of OT to a wide range of legal subjects, see IAN AYRES,
OPTIONAL LAW-THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005).
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AYRES, supra note 68, at 3. Consider, for instance, the case of a start-up company that to promote
a new product decides to market it below cost. Although the original investment would have a negative
NPV, it could still be worth pursuing if one considers the embedded expansion option it contains. By
making the new brand known to customers, the company is, in fact, acquiring a call option to make followon investments which could be very profitable (as in the case in which the original product is successful or
the relevant market suddenly expands) and that could otherwise be definitely lost.
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Id.
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accordingly. In fact, anticipating the debt contract’s inadequacy to prevent managerial
opportunism, creditors also apply an extra premium over the interest rate they ask to
cover themselves against the investment’s underlying risk.71 Hence, to hold directors
liable for the repayment of creditors’ claims, as the Lyonnais court seems to suggest,
would be wrong. As long as directors respect the risk accepted by creditors, they should
not be held liable, not even in the case of a default on payment. Indeed, creditors are exante compensated for bearing that risk. From a real-option perspective, one could thus
say that as long as directors pay for it, they can exercise whatever option is embedded in
a corporate investment.

PART III
A NORMATIVE THEORY
The prior parts have individuated three basic problems in the current approach to
corporate fiduciary law: (i) the inadequacy of the debt contract to govern the debtorcreditor relationship efficiently; (ii) the social costs that may derive from this
inefficiency; and (iii) the incompleteness of the insolvency exception (or the financial
distress exception) as a doctrine justifying the need for a directorial duty to creditors. To
remedy these problems, I propose the adoptions of two legal instruments: a default duty
of directors to creditors and a textualist interpretative regime of the debt contract.
1. Directors’ Duty to Creditors
I agree with contractarians that the best way to enhance corporate welfare is to
maximize shareholder value.72 However, as previously discussed, in a corporate
governance system dominated by shareholder primacy, managerial opportunism and
informational asymmetry may compromise the parties’ ability to write good debt
contracts.73 To increase efficiency, I propose the adoption of a default rule of law
imposing on directors a duty not to increase unilaterally the risk accepted by creditors in
the debt contract (hereinafter, creditors’ accepted risk or CAR).
71

See supra Part I, Par. 2.2.
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Because of their position as residual claimants, shareholders have indeed the best incentives to
make discretionary decisions. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 67-8.
73

See supra Part I, Par. 2.2.
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According to the Coase theorem, in a world of symmetric information and zero
transaction costs, there would be no need for a default duty of directors to creditors.
Regardless of the initial distribution of legal entitlements, parties would be able to
remedy privately the negative externalities arising under the current corporate governance
system. In the real world, however, the manager-creditor relationship is characterized
both by high transaction costs and asymmetric information. Hence, the initial distribution
of legal entitlements does matter to enhance efficiency. In this context, a duty of directors
to creditors would serve to: (i) deter managerial opportunism; (ii) remedy the current lack
of managers’ incentives to disclose information;74 and (iii) make credible the information
disclosed by managers to creditors.
Managers are the parties in the best position to evaluate the hidden options of an
investment, including increasing the investment’s risk ex-post. However, to avoid
expropriation of creditor value, managers (i.e., debtor companies) must pay for the
exercise of these options. This requires that they disclose credible information to
creditors. Only in this way can creditors adequately price the option(s) to be purchased by
managers (i.e., debtors). The proposed duty makes directors personally liable to creditors
if they fail to do so and exercise an option for which they have not paid. In particular, the
liability threat arising from the existence of the duty would serve to produce three
beneficial effects. First, it would discourage managers from undertaking courses of
actions that maximize share value by expropriating creditor value. Second, it would give
managers incentives to disclose information to creditors and to complete the debt
contract, both at bargaining (ex-ante) and after the contract is signed (ex-post). Because
under the proposed rule managers must abide by the level of risk specified in the debt
contract, if they fail to disclose relevant information to creditors, they risk wasting good
business opportunities. To avoid liability, they would be forced to give up all those
investment options that have not been negotiated with creditors. Hence, managers would
opt for disclosure. Third, the liability threat would serve as a mechanism to signal
credible information to creditors. Knowing that directors bear personal losses for the
breach of the duty, creditors would deem credible the information disclosed by
74

As it will be hereinafter discussed, directors would be induced to disclose information both as
effect of the duty and of the textualist interpretative regime of the debt contract. See infra Part III, Par. 3.
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directors.75
The duty’s overall effect would be to enable creditors to screen firms on the basis
of their specific risk.76 As a result, they would be able to negotiate better investment
policy restrictions and could more effectively control the investment’s risk.77 More
importantly, in competitive markets, the larger availability of information on corporate
risk would promote a more efficient mechanism of debt pricing. Creditors would tend to
move from a pooling equilibrium, in which they price debt on the basis of the average
risk increase pursued by firms, to separating equilibria, in which debt pricing is
determined by the marginal risk of firms.78 Finally, a default duty of directors to creditors
would lead to a better allocation of credit capital and, therefore, reduce the social costs
discussed above.79
Still, one could argue that there would be no need for the law to supplement in
this fashion the terms of the debt contract since private negotiation would be sufficient to
remedy inefficiency. Creditors could buy out directors’ liability and the same efficient
outcome would follow. The problem with this view is that creditors would not incur
additional transaction costs to prevent a risk (i.e., managerial opportunism) for which
they can be ex-ante compensated by increasing the cost of debt. In fact, even the
imposition of a default duty to their benefit might not be enough to give creditors
incentives to move from one market equilibrium to the other. As a matter of financial
theory, the creditors’ payoffs in pooling or separating equilibria are the same.80 Thus, to
75

This is the reason why, absent the duty, the attempt of good firms’ directors to achieve separating
equilibria by disclosing information to creditors would not work. Because of the asymmetric information
problem, creditors would not be able to recognize that these directors are good directors. Neither could
creditors rely on a bonding mechanism inducing directors to be good. As a result, they would not deem
credible the information disclosed by directors.
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Alternative instruments to induce creditors’ screening are the debtor’s posting of security or grant
of guarantees. Unlike the duty, however, these are limited resources. Cf. Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts
and Priority in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV 1396, 1415-17 (1997) (denying that an inefficient pooling
equilibrium would apply as to secured and unsecured borrowers).
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Even though there would still be bad firms, which contract for a certain level of risk and then
undertake riskier projects, the threat of a personal liability of directors would reduce their number.
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Cf. Schwartz, supra note 76, at 1416 (arguing that as long as unsecured borrowers could disclose
information to creditors a pooling interest rate would not apply).
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See supra Part I, Par. 2.2.
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For a general but rigorous treatment of the microeconomics of the matter, see MAS-COLELL ET.
supra note 9, at 462.
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achieve a Pareto improvement in the market equilibrium, some other incentives must be
provided besides those arising out of the competition among creditors. As I will claim in
detail thereinafter, the adoption of a regime of textualist interpretation of the debt
contract, paired to the duty’s adoption, would provide the right incentives.
2. Contract and Duty: The Bonding Mechanism Function
As a default rule of law, the actual scope and content of the proposed duty to
creditors would be determined by the parties’ negotiation. Parties themselves would set
the boundaries of the duty depending on the level of risk they agree upon in the debt
contract. From this perspective, the duty would serve, essentially, as a bonding
mechanism giving directors incentives to stay in the contract.81 In this sense, I offer a
new contractarian perspective of directors’ duty to creditors. As advocated by
contractarians, under the fiduciary model I propose, directors’ obligations to creditors are
determined by contract. The existence of a default duty, however, would remedy the debt
contract’s inefficiency that the contractarian analysis neglects to consider. On the one
hand, this fiduciary paradigm would deter managerial opportunism and give directors
incentives to disclose information. On the other, since the violation of the contractual
provisions establishing the duty would constitute a breach of the duty itself,82 it would
induce managers to fulfill the contract. This would reduce monitoring costs. Being able to
rely on the incentives provided by the duty, creditors would need to spend less to verify
directors’ performance. Also for this reason, the cost of credit capital would decrease.
Hence, my proposal would make the parties able to devise the best allocation
between risk, policy restrictions, and cost of capital. Accordingly, contracting parties
would determine privately what scope the duty should have to maximize the value of
their exchange. For instance, they could provide for a different scope of the duty
depending on the financial conditions of the company. Until the company is a going
concern, directors would be free to pursue any kind of investment they may like. If the
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By imposing on directors to bear personal losses for the breach of the contractual provisions on
creditors’ accepted risk, the duty would guarantee creditors from directors’ misbehavior. On the incentive
function of bonding mechanisms, see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 22, at 308.
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Par. 3.

Provided that a default on payment occurs as a result of the breach of the duty; see infra Part III,
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company started to experience financial distress, directors would then be held to the
respect of some financial parameters. With the same logic, contracting parties could agree
that directors are free to pursue risky projects even when the corporation is “in the
vicinity of insolvency”. The question would simply be how much the creditor(s) would
ask to sell this kind of option (i.e., to bear the higher risk that this option would imply).
More generally, three basic scenarios could be individuated as to the contractual
determination of the duty to creditors:
(i) on a (purely) theoretical level, the debt contract could be silent as to the risk
accepted by creditors, meaning that it might contain no protective or restrictive
covenants. In this case, directors would be free to pursue any project they may like.
Indeed, under a regime of textualist interpretation of the debt contract (which will be
hereinafter discussed in details), creditors would be presumed to have accepted any kind
of risk in such theoretical circumstances;
(ii) the debt contract could specify the level of risk accepted by creditors and,
therefore, set the limits of the duty. In this case, the law would supplement the obligations
undertaken by the company, as subscriber of the debt contract, with a side obligation of
directors. Thus, in a way, directors could be regarded as guarantors of the company’s
obligations as to creditors’ accepted risk;
(iii) the debt contract could specify the level of risk accepted by creditors, but at
the same time establish an exculpatory clause for directors’ liability to creditors. In this
case, as in the first, directors could never be held liable for breach of the duty. Here,
however, the company would still be liable to creditors for breach of the contract; while
in the first case, both the directors and the company would be exempted from liability.
Under this view, the insolvency exception would no longer apply. The duty to
creditors would not shift upon corporate insolvency or financial distress, but be
determined by the parties at the conclusion of the debt contract. Indeed, not only do I
claim that the insolvency exception is an incomplete doctrine of the duty to creditors, but
also a misleading one. It is incomplete because, as previously discussed,83 it neglects that
directors’ incentives to behave opportunistically arise in the same moment in which the
company incurs indebtedness. It is misleading because it implies that directors owe the
83

See supra Part II, Par. 2.2.
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same duties to shareholders and creditors. This creates uncertainty and exacerbates the
intrinsic conflict between these two classes of stakeholders.84 Hence, this proposal does
not impose on directors any obligation to maximize creditor value,85 but the different one
of respecting the investment’s risk agreed upon in the debt contract by the parties’
themselves.
3. The Enforcement of the Duty to Creditors and the Need for a Textualist
Interpretative Regime of the Debt Contract
Because the contract itself determines the actual scope and content of the duty,
establishing whether directors are liable to creditors becomes essentially a matter of
contractual interpretation. More specifically, the enforcement mechanism of the duty
entails two different interpretative steps. The first is to determine the risk agreed upon by
the parties. The second is to understand whether directors have increased that level of risk
ex-post (i.e., after the signing of the credit agreement).
As to the first step, it must be initially observed that creditors always accept the
investment’s systematic risk, which they automatically discount at the conclusion of the
debt contract. Thus, directors do not owe creditors a duty as to this type of risk. To say
otherwise, would mean requiring directors to guarantee the repayment of creditors’
claims, which is not the purpose of the duty.86 Thus, creditors who finance a car
manufacturing company always accept (and discount) the risk of failure determined by a
car industry crisis. Consequently, they could never sue directors for the company’s
default due to such circumstances. Similarly, creditors accept the specific risk of failure;
for instance, the risk that the car manufacturing company may default on payment
because of the poor sales of a new line of cars. However, unlike the case of the
systematic risk, creditors may limit the investment’s specific risk by contract.87 For
84

See supra Part I, Par. 2.1.
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As previously discussed, this would lead to a policy of underinvestment which would ultimately
compromise the maximization of corporate welfare. Id.
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See supra the discussion at text following note 71.
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As long established under the CAPM theory, devised by Stanford Professor William Sharpe and
Harvard Professor John Lintner, an alternative way in which creditors may limit the specific risk they bear
is through the diversification of their investments. See John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the
Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budget, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT. 13 (1965);
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instance, the creditors of the car-manufacturing company could negotiate an investment
policy restriction against the undertaking of new lines of business. By so doing, they
would rule out the risk that the directors may decide to reconvert the company’s
production into aircraft manufacturing and fail to repay the debt because of this
undertaking.
To individuate the specific risk accepted by creditors, I suggest that the contract
should be interpreted literally. This means, in the first place, that creditors should be
deemed to have accepted (and discounted) any kind of (specific) risk that they have not
expressly excluded or contractually limited. In this way, both parties would have an
incentive to bargain for the best allocation of risk. Indeed, a textualist interpretative
regime would prompt a Nash bargaining between directors and creditors ultimately
leading to optimality. Because under such a regime creditors would bear the unspecified
risk, they would have incentives to specify the risk they accept. Directors, on the
contrary, would seem induced to conceal information and specify less. In this way, they
could indeed limit their liability and reserve investment options. At a closer look,
however, directors would also be incentivized to specify the contract.88
Imagine this negotiating sequence. At the parties’ kick-off meeting, the managers
illustrate a business plan that is rather generic. Being aware that they are presumed to
accept any risk that is not limited by contract, creditors would seek to impose restrictions
on the firm’s investment policy. However, lacking information on the actual risk of the
investment, they would draft general covenants, which are low state-contingents on the
external state (i.e., the corporate activity). This would result in the exclusion of a large set
of investment opportunities and, therefore, broaden directors’ liability. Hence, at the
drafting session, rational managers would ask for some modifications of the general
William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, 19 J.
FIN. 425 (1964). The incentive scheme provided by the CAPM model, however, does not promote
contractual efficiency. Under such a theory, creditors have indeed no incentives to expend resources to
write better contracts, since they can diversify their risk away simply by investing in different classes of
capital assets.
88

Besides the incentives arising out of the imposition of the duty to creditors and the textualist
interpretative regime, directors would be induced to disclose information to avoid the imposition of
excessively high interest rates. Where creditors were completely uninformed as to the risk affecting the
debtor company, they would presumably charge an interest rate so high that good firms directors could
decide to make different capital structure choices. On the contrary, bad firms would still borrow. As a
result, an adverse selection problem would take place.
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covenants. In order to obtain such modifications, however, they would be forced to
disclose credible information to creditors. Because of this interaction, parties would write
contracts as state-contingent as possible. The availability of information on the
investment’s risk would have parties to negotiate for detailed contractual provisions,
which would be effective in preventing managerial opportunism without imposing
excessive restrictions on the firm’s investment policy. This would maximize the utility of
both parties. Debtors would benefit from a reduction of both the interest rate applied to
debt89 and opportunity costs. Creditors would be ex-ante compensated for the exercise of
the investment’s hidden options that managers intend to exercise. Finally, the
specification of the contract would induce creditors to price debt on the basis of such
specification rather than through a pooling mechanism. In this way, some efficiency
could be reached.
A regime of textualist interpretation would also mandate to read restrictively the
contractual provisions that specify creditors’ accepted risk (i.e., the CAR provisions). As
pointed out by Professor Schwartz together with Professor Scott,90 contractual clauses
should be interpreted on a narrow evidentiary base, which essentially includes solely the
contract itself.91 Moreover, it should be assumed that these clauses are written in the
majority talk, i.e., in the “language that people typically use when communicating with
each other.”92 The reason explaining why contractual terms should be read restrictively is
that contracting parties have more and better information on the substantive terms of their
exchange than any other party. 93 Hence, they are in the best position to assess the relative
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Even assuming that the described mechanism should not lead to a reduction of the interest rate, it
would still promote efficiency. The reduction of opportunity costs determined by the negotiation of more
state-contingent covenants would, indeed, produce this result.
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See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 5.
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Id., at 572. More specifically, Schwartz and Scott individuate the evidentiary base to be allowed
in a strict textualist approach in: (i) the contract, (ii) an English language dictionary, and (iii) the
interpreter'
s experience and understanding of the world.
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Id., at 570.
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Not only some of the parties’ information would not be observable by the third adjudicator, but,
even when observable, it would not be verifiable. This means that the third adjudicator could observe the
information, but could not verify its existence at reasonable costs and with reasonable accuracy. As a result,
the adjudicator would be unable to enforce parties’ obligations on the basis of such information. See
Eggleston et al., supra note 10, at 119-20 (considering the case of a long-term contract for the delivery of
some perishable goods, in which the parties agree that the goods to be delivered must be of some standard
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costs and benefits of their relationship and allocate contractual rights so to maximize the
value of their exchange.94 From this perspective, any contractual interpretation not
conforming to the letter of the contract would risk altering the distribution of rights
agreed upon by the parties and, in turn, reducing the expected value of their exchange.95
In particular, in the case of the managers-creditors relationship, broadening the
evidentiary base of contractual interpretation would lead to a managerial policy of
underinvestment. If the CAR could be determined on the basis of the courts’ subjective
interpretation of the parties’ intentions, rather than the letter of the contract, managers
would be so concerned over the possibility of a judicial error that they would avoid
taking risk altogether. Because corporations need to take risks to prosper, this would
jeopardize the maximization of corporate welfare. In addition, parties could exploit the
risks implied by the third adjudicator’s ex-post completion of the debt contract and
engage in strategic behaviors. 96
In this context, the second interpretative step of the duty’s enforcement,
understanding whether directors have increased creditors’ accepted risk ex-post, requires
essentially an analysis of the CAR provisions. Because creditors accept any risk they do
not contractually exclude or limit, directors can be held liable to creditors only if they
violate one of these clauses. In this sense, the breach of a CAR provision is a necessary
condition for the enforcement of the duty to creditors. However, it is not also a sufficient
condition. To be able to claim directors’ liability, creditors must also be damaged by the
conduct of directors. For instance, suppose that a restrictive covenant prohibits firm A
from investing in project x, which creditors consider too risky. Regardless of the
covenant’s provision, the company’s directors decide to invest in the project. Project x,
however, performs well and the company is able to meet its payment obligations. In such
quality. At a certain point the buyer refuses the goods, claiming that their quality is substandard. By the
time the court settles the dispute, the court will most likely be unable to verify the quality of the goods
because of their perishable nature. And, even if the goods had not yet perished, a court might not be able to
distinguish a good of standard quality from one of substandard quality due to lack of specific expertise.)
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See supra note 13. See also, in similar terms, Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in
Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 864-65 (2000).
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In these terms, see, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 13, at 271; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 5, at 549.
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Indeed, under the current regime, the uncertainty surrounding legal procedures would induce
creditors to prefer out of court settlements. See supra note 39. As a consequence, borrowers might attempt
to profit from this tendency of creditors to seek more favourable contract’s terms.
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a case, although the company would be liable to creditors for breach of the contract,
directors would not.
Under this view, it would be necessary to draw a distinction between two different
kinds of contractual clauses. On one side, there are the CAR provisions, which fix the
risk accepted by creditors. On the other, there are provisions setting the terms of
repayment of debt. The violation of just one type of contractual provisions does not entail
the breach of the duty to creditors. Directors cannot be held liable when the default on
payment is not due to the violation of the CAR. In the same way, directors would not be
liable when the violation of the CAR is not followed by a default on payment. Only when
a payment obligation is violated following the breach of a CAR provision, would
directors be liable to creditors. Indeed, even if creditor value could be depreciated before
the actual default on payment, giving creditors the right to enforce the duty prior to the
occurrence of such an event would create uncertainty.97 Creditors, however, could always
trigger the contract for breach of the CAR provision and seek compensation from the
corporation.
4. Exemption from Liability
Under the proposed model, directors would have several options to negotiate an
exemption from liability. First, as anticipated above, they could negotiate exculpatory
clauses from liability. This does not mean that directors could undertake any kind of
project they choose. The debt contract could still impose limits on the management of the
firm’s investment policy. However, directors would not be personally liable to creditors
for the breach of such investment policy restrictions. Second, should they want to reserve
further options to increase the level of risk agreed upon in the debt contract,98 directors
would have two alternatives at their disposal. They could bargain for a contractual right
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To establish ex-ante (i.e., before a default on payment) whether the depreciation of creditors’
claims has been determined by the breach of the duty (i.e., of the CAR provision) or other macro-economic
variable would, indeed, be very difficult.
98

Practically, managers would reserve an option to negotiate for future options. Under this view, the
debt contract would serve to provide for general criteria regulating the future negotiation of the parties. In
optional language, the parties would fix criteria establishing how future options should be priced.
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either to renegotiate the credit agreement’s terms or to exit the relationship through a debt
refinancing.99
This set of options to avoid liability would not impair the system of incentives
provided by the proposed duty as to the disclosure of information. Indeed, in seeking
exculpatory clauses, managers would disclose information. Above all, opting out of the
duty would have an intrinsic informational meaning. Creditors would evaluate and price
the project’s risk also on the basis of the directors’ request for an exculpatory clause.100
Similarly, in order to renegotiate contractual terms for engaging in riskier corporate
strategies, directors would be forced to reveal further information.101 This set of liability
exemptions would also avoid the risk that the duty might result in an over-conservative
managerial investment policy. The exemptions from the rule would serve as additional
contractual instruments the parties would have at their disposal for devising the best
allocation between investment’s risk and cost of capital.
From this perspective, directors’ discretion in the firm’s management would
increase, while uncertainty in legal relationships would be reduced. Unlike in the current
corporate fiduciary law model, directors of financially distressed firms should no longer
be concerned as to the actual beneficiaries of their fiduciary duties or the undertaking of
excessively risky corporate projects. Regardless of the financial conditions of the
corporation, directors would be free to pursue whatever strategy they might deem
beneficial, as long as they (i) respect the CAR; or (ii) bargain for exculpatory clauses
from liability; or (iii) engage in re-negotiation of the agreement’s terms (or buy-out such
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In other terms, the parties could provide for buy-out agreements giving the debtor the right to exit
the relationship with the creditors by refinancing the project.
100

In the case of the negotiation of exculpatory clauses, creditors would face a risk that directors
could disclose false information. Even in the absence of personal liability, however, the risk of reputational
capital depreciation would discourage directors to act in this way. In addition, creditors could bargain for a
bonding mechanism designed to ensure the truthfulness of directors’ information.
101

From this perspective, the duty would also reduce the risk of strategic behaviors of the parties
during renegotiation. Absent the bonding mechanism offered by the duty, instead, creditors would not be
able to renegotiate intelligently since they could not adequately estimate the value of the riskier project(s)
that managers want to undertake. See Myers, supra note 28, at 158.
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a right). As a result, the duty would exclude that the fear of liability’s exposure might
impair managers’ decision-making when their resolute action would be most needed. 102
5. The Distinction between Capital Providers and Other Fixed Claimants
Although the discussion on the proposed duty has so far referred generally to
corporate creditors, not all the firm’s fixed claimants would actually need being attributed
such a duty. Essentially, by corporate creditors, I mean the firm’s capital providers. In
their case, the attribution of the duty would be justified by the need for modifying the
current distribution of legal entitlements to enable parties to write better contracts.
Instead, in the case of other fixed claimants, the law would already attribute express
rights to solve the potential inefficiency arising from the creditors’ relationship with the
corporation.103 Labor law, for instance, is the legal instrument designed to solve the
inefficiency of the employment contract.
In addition, other fixed claimants’ contractual relationship with the corporation
would be characterized by a lower transactional insecurity.104 The expression describes
the situation that may arise when the parties’ performances take place sequentially. When
one party performs before the other, she may risk that the counterparty may deny her the
benefit bargained for in return. In lender-borrower relationships, this risk is elevated since
the lender carries out in full her side of the exchange before the debtor. In contrast, in the
case of other fixed claimants, for instance trade creditors, this risk is limited by the fact
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This was one of the main critiques raised against the vicinity of insolvency standard proposed in
the Credit Lyonnais decision. See, among others, Rao, supra note 12, at 58, 66 (adducing empirical
evidence to confirm that, under the vague Credit Lyonnais regime, directors of financially troubled
companies would prefer to terminate their office rather than face the liability’s exposure. Thus, nearlyinsolvent companies would risk “go[ing] bare” in the moment in which they need the resolute action of
their managers most. In addition, the prospect of such “poorly defined, potentially large liability” would
“chill directors'exercise of their business judgment when confronted with difficult choices.” Indeed,
directors may “feel constrained to make overly-conservative decisions when they are unsure whether their
corporation is in the ‘vicinity of insolvency.’”). In similar terms, see McDonnell, supra note 53, at 180
(arguing that “[d]irectors …, fearing the imposition of personal liability, may be hesitant to accept or
remain in their positions.) See also authors quoted supra at note 12.
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I do not share the view that remedial redundancy would, in fact, not be a problem. See Lipson,
supra note 1, at 1256. I argue instead that the overlapping of different causes of action would create
uncertainty and, therefore, compromise efficiency. See also supra Part I, Par. 2.2.
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The expression transactional insecurity is borrowed by Professor Kronman. See Anthony T.
Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 5, 6 (1985).
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that they usually provide their service/goods on a short-term basis.105 If the debtor
defaults on payment, they can simply stop providing the services or good and take their
business elsewhere.106
A further line, then, should be drawn among the same capital providers. Because
of both economic and organizational advantages, banks would be more able than
bondholders to write good debt contracts. Thus, at the margin, bondholders would benefit
more from the attribution of the proposed duty than would banks. The problem of the
shortage of available information, which represents the main cause of contractual
inefficiency, would be more pressing in the case of bondholders. Indeed, they would not
have the same ability as do banks to obtain and process information. Banks are often
specialized in providing funds to companies in specific industries, which gives them a
qualified knowledge of the trends and developments in the debtor’s business. As a result,
not only do banks tend to have more information than bondholders, but also to be in a
better position to assess the firm-specific and industry-specific risk. Furthermore, to
obtain information, banks could use economic and political means that bondholders
would not have at their disposal.107
Still, it could be argued that the information released in the bond prospectus and
that provided by rating agencies would be sufficient to ensure a “fairly high level of
disclosure.”108 This analysis, however, overstates both the quality of the information
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In fact, trade creditors bear a risk of insolvency limited to the payment of the last supply
provided to the firm. And they bear this risk independently from the undertaking by the management of
asset substitution investments. The company managers could simply wake up one day and decide they
prefer the goods or services supplied by another trade creditor. Under this view, the distinction between
less and more sophisticated trade creditors would matter to a limited extent. See Lipson, supra note 1, at
1248-49. In both cases, the short term of credit would limit the damage suffered by the creditors.
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The position of trade creditors, however, should be regarded differently when their relationship
with the corporation has an idiosyncratic nature. By idiosyncratic relationships, I mean those where one of
the parties makes investments that have limited redeployability to alternative uses (i.e., specific
investments) and is, therefore, subject to a significant risk of opportunistic behavior by the counterparty. In
the case of trade creditors, they may well specialize in providing services/goods that are exclusively
tailored to a particular corporation. Under these circumstances, then, their position would be assimilable to
that of the firm’s capital providers. Imagine, for instance, that a company has a sole supplier and also holds
the sole right to its services. The supplier’s investment is firm-specific, since its services are not
recoverable once committed to the company. In such a case, the same reasons discussed above to justify the
exclusion of the duty to trade creditors would impose to grant it.
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See Lipson, supra note 1, at 1249-50.
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Lipson, supra note 1, at 1250.
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released to bondholders and the latter’s ability to process it. Not only information
contained in the bond prospectus is often not so material,109 but information provided by
rating agencies tends to be assembled by putting firms in risk categories and calculating
the average risk of that category.110 Thus, in a way, rating agencies are responsible for the
current pooling equilibrium between bad and good firms. Finally, the dispersive nature of
the organizational structure of bondholders raises coordination problems which may
impair their ability to process information and write good debt contracts.
6. Some Policy Considerations
An aspect of this proposal which might raise some difficulties is that of directors’
liability insurance. It is indeed presumable that directors will seek some form of coverage
against their potential liability to creditors, either requiring extra compensation or
company-funded insurance.111 In this way, the ultimate cost of directors’ liability would
be borne by the company’s shareholders. It could thus be argued that the liability threat
would no longer serve to induce directors to disclose information since they would not
have to pay for creditors’ damages out of their own pockets.
I claim, instead, that directors’ liability insurance would alter the incentive effects
arising out of the duty to creditors only to a limited extent and not necessarily for the
worst. Although they would not bear personal losses for the breach of the duty, directors
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See Mitchell, Corporate Bondholders, supra note 20, at 1181 (claiming that “the prospectus
more restates than explains relevant bond terms and is always qualified by reference to the indenture.”)
Professor Mitchell also quote BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 68, for whom bond prospectuses, "like most
legal documents, . . . review only the conditions and safeguards that exist and do nothing to draw your
attention to any omission or unusual features."
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Rating agencies classify risk categories on the basis of macroeconomic indexes, such as the debtto-equity ratio, liquidity of the existing assets, dividend policy, etc. Normally, they do not offer more
sophisticated information on the firm than the Wall Street Journal does. Credit markets, however, tend to
price debt instruments consistently with the rating agencies’ assessments.
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Company-funded liability insurance seems more likely. Indeed, the increase in the salary
compensation that directors would demand if required to pay for the insurance cost would probably be
unbearable. Moreover, the cost of insurance whether purchased directly by the company would presumably
decrease, because of the higher bargaining power of the firm. In these terms, see Vanessa Finch, Personal
Accountability and Corporate Control: The Role of Directors and Officers’ Liability Insurance, 57
MODERN LAW REVIEW 881 (1994); Rainier Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Cost of Legal
Control, 93 YALE L. J. 857 (1984).
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would still be subject to a significant reputational threat as a result of the liability rule.112
Indeed, I do not conceive of directors’ liability as a compensatory means, even though in
closely held corporations it could serve also this function. The duty to creditors is,
instead, the legal tool inducing directors to disclose credible information to creditors.
When directors are covered against liability, this basic function of the duty would be
ensured by the reputational capital depreciation that would follow its breach. In addition,
the risk-spreading effect of liability insurance would limit shareholders’ preference for
asset substitution investments. Their expected gains out of these investments would be
reduced by the expected costs of directors’ liability. Finally, liability insurance might
have the positive effect of shifting part of creditors’ monitoring costs to insurance
companies. Insurance policies’ terms might, in fact, be expected to provide for the
monitoring of directors’ conduct in a number of ways. Investigations of firms’ financial
conditions and past records, requests of periodical information, and recurrent assessments
of insurance premiums are just a few examples.
More interesting is to understand the impact of the liability insurance on the
choice of the corporate fiduciary model and capital structure. Depending on the effect of
the liability rule on the cost of equity, directors would indeed shape their contractual
relationships with creditors differently. If the increase in the cost of equity due to the
liability insurance outweighed the reduction of the cost of debt determined by the liability
rule, it is probable that directors would bargain for exculpatory clauses. On the contrary,
if the reduction of the cost of debt more than compensated for the increase in the cost of
equity, directors would find it profitable to maintain the liability rule. Simultaneously, the
cost of liability/insurance would influence directors’ decisions as to the firm’s optimal
capital structure. Indeed, the contractual arrangement achieved by the parties on
directors’ liability to creditors might change the proportion of debt and equity capital that
maximizes firm value.113 From this perspective, innovative finance could play an
important role in devising hybrid financial instruments that would better reflect not only
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Even in the absence of personal losses, directors engaging in asset substitution would be
penalised by bad reputation once they return to the market to borrow again. The company would have to
pay a higher interest rate to obtain credit and, in turn, directors’ compensation would decrease.
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This seems consistent with Smith and Warner’s conclusion that “there is an optimal form for the
debt contract, but an optimal amount of debt as well.” Smith & Warner, supra note 11, at 154.
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the risk of the underlying assets, but also the parties’ distribution of entitlements and
liabilities.

CONCLUSIONS
Creditors’ rights should be governed by contract. Under the current model of
corporate fiduciary law, however, managerial opportunism and informational asymmetry
make the parties unable to write optimal debt contracts. This, in turn, leads to the
inefficient allocation of credit capital.
To remedy the present inefficiency, I propose the adoption of two legal institutions:
a default duty of directors not to increase unilaterally the risk contractually accepted by
creditors and a regime of textualist interpretation of the debt contract. Such institutions
would serve two basic functions: (i) discouraging managerial opportunism; and (ii)
inducing managers to disclose credible information to creditors. As a result, a Pareto
improvement in the credit market equilibrium could be reached.
By charging directors with personal liability for the ex-post increase of the
investment’s risk, the duty would bond managers to stay in the contract and prevent them
from exercising investment options without compensating creditors. In addition, the
double-system of incentives provided by the duty and the textualist interpretative regime
of the debt contract would, respectively, induce directors to disclose credible information
and creditors to specify the risk they accept. This would lead parties to write more statecontingent contracts and enable creditors to better evaluate the risk underlying corporate
projects. Indeed, creditors could rely both on the disclosure of credible information and
on directors’ incentives to fulfill the contract arising out of the duty’s existence. As a
consequence of the more accurate evaluation of corporate risk, it would become possible
to screen firms depending on their specific risk. Hence, the credit market would move
from a pooling equilibrium, in which debt price is determined by the average risk
increase pursued by firms, to separating equilibria. In this way, some efficiency would be
reached.
This legal framework would also reduce monitoring and opportunity costs. The
first would diminish because the duty serves as a bonding mechanism inducing directors
to fulfill contractual obligations. Opportunity costs, instead, would be reduced by the
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parties’ ability to specify optimal investment policy restrictions, which would control the
investment’s risk without inefficiently constraining managerial discretion. Finally, the
adoption of a textualist interpretative regime would also curb uncertainty and avoid the
possible reduction of the expected value of the parties’ relationship due to the ex-post
completion of the contract by the third adjudicator.
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